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Access and the Public Domain
Randal C. Picker*

One of the constitutive notions of intellectual property is the public domain. These are the
ideas, notions and works that are usable by all where no person can invoke a right to
block use by another. I will be focusing on copyright here, but of course the idea of the
public domain is also at work in other areas of intellectual property. Defining the precise
boundaries of the copyright public domain in the U.S. takes real work and there are
obviously hotly-contested, high-level legal issues about those boundaries, such as those at
stake in Eldred and Golan.1
My interests here are more mundane. I am interested in the mechanics of accessing
the public domain and the consequences of the choices that we make about the
operational effectiveness of various tools available for controlling access to the public
domain. That matters both for the extent of access but also importantly for the scale and
scope of competition in the provision of the public domain. This takes us to contract and
terms of use; to the core of copyright in what it means to be original and also what it
means to copy; to copyright’s periphery in the form of the deposit requirement; to the
DMCA and its tools of distant control; and to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and its
restrictions on accessing materials and objects under local control. With the emergence of
major digital scanning projects for works in the public domain—call these online public
domain repositories (OPDRs)—we are at a point of possibly unparalleled practical access
to the public domain. But the decisions we make about the tools just described will have
a strong effect on the scope of the actual access to the public domain that emerges and in
the extent of competition on the provision and use of the public domain.
We face standard conflicts about the limits of appropriability, efforts to expand
appropriation and the possible consequences of those efforts for effective access to the
public domain and overall welfare. Many institutions undertaking major scanning
projects will have their interests first and foremost in mind. Some of those interests will
relate to the substantial costs associated with digitizing works and hosting them. Those
costs have to be financed and fully unfettered access to the public domain may be
inconsistent with that financing.
* Copyright © 2013, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
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1 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 537 U.S. 186 (2012).
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That said, there is a broader set of questions that I am interested in, namely, exactly
how unpropertied is the public domain? I confess that I am not sure that “property” as
such is necessarily even the right framing for that question, but it does capture some of
what is at stake. We think of the public domain as open to all and in that sense owned by
no one (or owned by all). But that ignores the question of how the public domain is
actually accessed. We have many tools that control that access and in that sense, through
those tools, we re-establish a shadow control regime for the public domain. And we are at
the early stages of architecting competition in digital libraries and one piece of that
process will be assessing the mechanisms for controlling access to the public domain.
Section I of the paper sketches out the emerging public domain. Section II considers
three conceptual questions for structuring use of the public domain focusing on the extent
to which the public domain should be viral; on whether we should insist that the public
domain be accessed only through the original artifacts embodying it; and on whether
private appropriability incentives for distribution of public domain scans match overall
social interests. Section III turns to the tools for restricting use of the public domain, to
copyright, contract, the DMCA and the CFAA. Each of these matters for access to the
public domain and for competition over it. Section IV considers one narrow question
regarding the relationship between copyright’s deposit requirement and a truly public
public domain, while the last section briefly concludes the paper.
I. The Emerging Public Domain
We should probably start with a quick synopsis of the core features of the copyright
public domain in the U.S. Works of the U.S. government enter the public domain
immediately on creation.2 Under long-standing case law, it is generally understood that
other governmental works, including those of state actors, are in the public domain as
well, though the statutory hook for that in the current copyright law is less clear than one
might like.3 Works published in the U.S. before 1923 are in the public domain as may be
a variety of other works depending on how well the ins and outs of copyright formalities
and renewal schemes were navigated over time.4
At a more conceptual level, ideas and facts are in the public domain as well.5 You
can’t copy the entire expression in a new non-fiction text work, unless you are willing to
make a pretty aggressive fair use argument, but separate from fair use, the
noncopyrightability of fact and ideas means that most of the meat in a non-fiction text
work is immediately available for use by all on publication. There will be interesting
2 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2011).
3 The Veeck case is the most interesting serious recent look at this issue and it offers a tour of the relevant cases. See

Veeck v. Southern Building Congress Code Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
4 The Cornell University Copyright Information Center maintains a very helpful guide on public domain status. See

Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States, CORNELL (Jan. 1, 2012), online at
http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm.
5 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv, Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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boundary cases—Harper & Row6 is a good example—but nonfiction texts release an
enormous amount of content into the public domain on publication. Use of textual fiction
is much more limited and matters again get more complicated as we move from text to
photographs, audio or video. To be sure, we could imagine a much larger public domain
and the duration of a copyright has a direct and important effect on the size of the public
domain, but the size of the public domain grows day by day.
But having work in the public domain and actually being able to use it are two quite
different matters. Use requires access and copyright isn’t a true access regime. I will
address the deposit requirement in Section IV below but I think that is fair to say that the
deposit rules haven’t ensured widespread availability of copyrighted works, be those
works that remain in copyright or works that have moved from copyright to the public
domain. Instead, the public domain is distributed and is often scattered throughout
libraries across the country. Library collection accession and deaccession practices over
time will determine the practical availability of a public domain tied to physical formats.
You can get a sense of this casually by picking an obscure public domain work and
searching WorldCat.org to see how the work is distributed physically. Of course,
interlibrary loan practices will matter importantly in assessing the practical availability of
the public domain. And that inquiry is framed as one in which you have a particular title
in mind and just need to track down a copy of that work. Many inquiries—the kinds of
searches we do everyday on Google and other search engines—are just unavailable on
physical works. Of course, there have always been indexing services like the Reader’s
Guide to Periodical Literature or the Social Sciences Citation Index but even once those
moved online, searching an indexed work is quite different from full-text searching on
the underlying works.
And it is an online, full-text search public domain that is being created in the form of
online public domain repositories (OPDRs). Consider briefly nine prominent projects:


The British Newspaper Archive: The British Library is bringing 300 years of
newspapers online. Newspapers are the day-to-day stories of our lives and provide an
unparalleled way of accessing the past. With the November 2011 launch of the British
Newspaper Archive, more than four million pages of scans came online, searchable
for free and downloadable for a fee, as PDFs.7



ProQuest Historical Newspapers: ProQuest offers an extensive—it boasts of nearly
30 million digitized pages—searchable collection of historical newspapers, including
nineteen general interest U.S papers. For many newspapers, including The Arizona
Republican, the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Detroit Free Press, the only content
offered is pre-1923 public domain content. And if content nearing a century old isn’t

6 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
7 See Amar Toor, British Library Digitizes 300 Years Worth of Newspaper Archives, Brings 65 Million Articles Online,

ENGADGET (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/11/30/british-library-digitizes-300-years-worth-ofnewspaper-archives/.
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enough to excite you, read the Nashville Tennessean, which starts in 1812. For other
newspapers, such as The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, ProQuest
offers public domain content and, pursuant to licenses, in-copyright content.8
ProQuest is offered on a subscription basis to libraries.


The Internet Archive: The Internet Archive is amassing a digital library of the web,
movies, live music, audio recordings and texts. Its web archive offers the Wayback
Machine: travel back in time on the Internet to see what your favorite website looked
like on a particular date. But the archive also offers more than 3 million texts for
reading and downloading.9 Old works, such as Little Goody Two Shoes, published in
1766, are very much alive at the Internet Archive.



JSTOR: Every academic knows and loves JSTOR, online at jstor.org. Most of the
content digitized by JSTOR is in copyright and is digitized through a license with the
copyright holder, but roughly 6% of the JSTOR content, nearly 500,000 articles, is in
the public domain.10 JSTOR terms this content Early Journal Content and, on
September 7, 2011, announced a plan to unbundle the public domain content from the
in-copyright content and make that public domain content available to all for free.11



Google Book Search: When Google announced its new Google Print Service at the
Frankfurt Book Fair in October 2004, it was clear that Google was taking a big step
forward to fulfill its mission statement: “organize the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful.”12 That has been a bumpy process—and the
litigation over it is ongoing—but Google hosts nearly 3 million public domain works
in GBS.13



HathiTrust: On October 13, 2008, two leading academic library consortia joined
forces to announce the creation of the HathiTrust.14 Libraries have been doing
scanning on their own, but libraries who are partners in the Google Book Search
project also get back copies of scans from Google, subject to restrictions detailed

8 See ProQuest Historical Newspapers, PROQUEST, http://www.proquest.com/en-US/catalogs/databases/detail/pq-hist-

news.shtml (last visited July 3, 2012).
9 See INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/details/texts (last visited July 3, 2012).
10 See Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in World, JSTOR, http://about.jstor.org/participate-

jstor/individuals/early-journal-content (last visited July 3, 2012).
11 JSTOR—Free Access to Early Journal Content and Serving “Unaffiliated” Users, JSTOR (Sep. 7, 2011, 3:02 AM),

http://about.jstor.org/news-events/news/jstor%E2%80%93free-access-early-journal-content.
12 Google Mission Statement, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last visited July 3, 2012).
13 Features of a Book on Google Play, GOOGLE,

http://support.google.com/googleplay/bin/answer.py?hl=en&p=books_features&answer=1062949 (last visited July 3,
2012).
14 Major Library Partners Launch HathiTrust Shared Digital Repository, HATHITRUST (Oct. 13, 2008)

http://www.hathitrust.org/press_10-13-2008.
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below. As of mid-March 2012, the HathiTrust held more than 10 million volumes
with almost 2.8 million public domain volumes.15


THOMAS: Works of the federal government enter the public domain on creation.16
That covers quite a bit, but note immediately that it covers all works of Congress and
the federal court system. In 1995, the Library of Congress launched THOMAS—
named in honor of Thomas Jefferson—as its window into congressional materials.17



Google Scholar: THOMAS doesn’t cover the work of federal courts. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court now issues its opinions online as released, it has only backfilled
to Volume 502 of the U.S. Reports, the official reporter for Supreme Court opinions.
If you are interested in case law in the first 500 volumes, you are out of luck. Law
libraries are full of shelf after shelf of published opinions and Westlaw and Lexis
brought those opinions online, though often at very high prices. Google has now
brought many of these opinions online and made them available for free at
scholar.google.com.



Bodleian Library and the Bibloteca Apostolica Vaticana: On April 12, 2012, these
two libraries, based, respectively, at the University of Oxford and the Vatican,
announced a plan to digitize 1.5 million pages of ancient texts held in their
collections.18
I could add more, but you get the point. The public domain is being assembled, digitized,
and made available to the public. These online repositories—online libraries?—represent
the possibility of a huge step forward in the day-to-day practical availability of the public
domain.19
II. Structuring Use of the Public Domain
I want to start by considering some preliminary conceptual questions about the use of the
public domain. I want to address three issues. First, does the fact that a subsequent work
incorporates the public domain have any consequence for the status of the first work? The
strong version of this argument would embrace a notion of a viral public domain along
the lines of the licensing approaches taken in open-source software. Second, to head to
the other extreme, I want to address to what extent use of the public domain is subject to
an original source requirement. Can you access the public domain through my
republication of it or must you track down an original to access the public domain? Third,
I want to consider the extent to which social and private incentives line up in the
15 See Statistics Information HATHITRUST http://www.hathitrust.org/statistics_info (last visited July 3, 2012).
16 17 U.S.C. § 105.
17 See THOMAS, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (last visited July 3, 2012).
18 Bodleian and Vatican Libraries to Digitise Ancient Texts, BODLEIAN LIBRARIES (Apr. 12, 2012),

http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/news/bodleian-and-the-vatican-libraries/.
19 Do note that while both Google and HathiTrust have faced litigation for their efforts, that litigation relates to the

digitization of in-copyright works and not for public domain works. Works in-copyright pose very different issues.
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distribution of content, including public domain content. Limits on appropriability may
mean that content possessors will take steps through contract, technical protection
measures and the like to limit subsequent use inefficiently just because it boosts their
ability to appropriate value from the content somewhat.
A. A Viral Public Domain?
We have seen a number of efforts over the last two decades to create viral ecosystems of
property. The best known examples of these are the original GNU General Public License
and its successors and the licenses of the Creative Commons. Somewhat ironically, these
“copyleft” approaches rely on copyright itself to impose conditions on those who use
prior work. The heart of the GPL is the fact that it is viral or infectious. To simplify
considerably, if you use code subject to a GPL, the work you in turn create has to be just
as useable by others as was the code that you started with. The idea is to plant a GPL
code seed and watch the code base expand around it always increasing the amount of
code available for use on GPL terms. It is the way in which use of the first software
attaches conditions to the new software enabling further use of that software which
makes the GPL viral.20
It is very much a counterfactual to imagine a fully viral public domain. Start with
nonfiction. Would my inclusion of public domain facts somehow mean that my otherwise
copyrightable expression would have to enter the public domain? That would seem to
exclude completely copyright in nonfiction text. We could imagine freestanding new
works of fiction—a new poem, perhaps—but we can imagine the line-drawing problems
that would arise.
And the idea that use of any public domain material put the resulting work in the
public domain would have dramatic consequences. Disney released its animated classic
Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs in 1937.21 The first full-length Disney animated film,
cel by hand-drawn cel, Snow White’s story was told again. Again, because, as everyone
knows, her story was an old one going back in print to at least 1812 in the Grimm
Brother’s fairy tale Little Snow-White.22 Her tale isn’t a long one—6½ pages in an 1876
English edition—but Disney made the most of it in making an 83-minute film and
unadjusted domestic grosses of almost $185 million.23 And Hollywood is going back to

20 For a detailed discussion, see Brett Smith, A Quick Guide to GPLv3, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM,

http://www.gnu.org/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.html (last updated June 10, 2012).
21 THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0029583/ (last visited July 3, 2012).
22 See D.L. Ashliman, Little Snow-White, http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type0709.html#snowwhite (last visited July 3,

2012).
23 And adjusted for ticket price inflation, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs grossed roughly $853,000,000, tenth on

the all-time list. See All Time Box Office, Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO,
http://boxofficemojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm (last visited July 3, 2012).
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the well again with the release in 2012 of two Snow White movies.24 It is hard to imagine
any of this work getting created with a viral public domain.
And of course we don’t take a GPL-like approach to the public domain in the U.S.
The copyright statute itself doesn’t really address this, but we might find an analog in
Section 103. That section addresses situations in which new copyrighted material and old
copyrighted material are mixed together. Assuming that you have permission to use the
old material, as a creator, you receive copyright in the new material and not the old
material. This is what we should anticipate: we would create very odd incentives if
incorporation of prior material stripped new material of its copyright protection. New
works would need to be vacuum-packed and carefully sealed to ensure that no public
domain content had somehow snuck in.
As to digital scans, we should anticipate that when scans are done well, nothing new
is added to them. That may limit the extent to which copyright can protect the scans
themselves—I address this below—but the fact that I include public domain content into
a new work doesn’t in and of itself somehow limit the scope of protection I can enjoy for
that work. I get what I get and the fact that the work is somehow derived from work in
the public domain in no way limits the protection that I enjoy for my work. This line of
analysis should limit the idea that some consequence attaches to the use of public domain
work in the new digital scans, something I think of as the “the works were in the public
domain and therefore” argument. I don’t think copyright itself fills in anything after the
therefore.
B. Original Sources, Derivative Sources and Copying the Public Domain
As we scan public domain works, we face something of a conundrum as to what it means
to copy a work. Suppose that we were to conclude that a scan itself was an independently
copyrightable object. For concreteness, consider a poem, say Casey at the Bat, written by
Ernest Thayer and first published in the San Francisco Examiner on June 3, 1888. A
search on Google Books turns up many copies of the poem, some published in books still
in copyright, while others, such as the 1911 America’s National Game by Albert G.
Spalding, have entered the public domain. 25
Suppose that Google claimed a copyright in the new digitized object that it has
created. Where would that put us? What would that copyright limit? The poem is
presented in full on the screen so that I can read it. I might be able to take a screen
capture of the poem and then set about extracting the text of the poem from the screen
capture. Were I to succeed in doing that, I would end up with just the text of the poem
24 Mirror Mirror, starring Julia Roberts, was released on March 30, 2012 (see BOX OFFICE MOJO,

http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=untitledsnowwhite.htm). Snow White and the Huntsman, with Charlize Theron as
the evil queen, was released July 1, 2012 (see BOX OFFICE MOJO,
http://boxofficemojo.com/search/?q=snow%20white%20and%20the%20huntsman).
25 Spalding recounts the initial publication of the poem and the public’s reaction to it. See Albert G. Spalding,

America’s national game, 449-54 (American Sports Publishing Co., 1911).
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and the poem itself, of course, is in the public domain. Even if I wasn’t able to bring to
bear the technical wizardry of capture and extraction, I could just type the poem into my
computer by hand. Again, in each case, I have copied the poem to be sure and that would
be a copyright violation save for the fact that the poem is in the public domain.
But what have I done vis-à-vis the new digitized object? We could imagine a regime
that barred access to the public domain through the scan. Obviously, there are always
proof problems, though in these circumstances, creators often seed their content with
unimportant, intentional mistakes in an effort to make proof of copying easier. A regime
that required subsequent firms to duplicate the efforts of the first firm in tracking down
an original artifact containing the public domain work would obviously maximally
protect the efforts of the first firm in doing just that. If tracking down and copying the
public domain is expensive, we might need an original source—or, put differently, noaccess-through—regime to ensure that the public domain was rediscovered in the first
place. Of course, requiring duplication of effort means that we are rebuilding the wheel
each time we want a competing copy of the public domain scan. This is a key point in
how we structure competing uses of the public domain.
Prior to Feist, there was a strand of analysis in the cases that came close to this
regime. The line drawn barred a subsequent user from extracting the public domain
content from a particular text but instead required the second user to gather her own
version of the public domain facts. Once those facts were in hand, then the second user
could use the first public domain copy as a tool for checking the new second
accumulation of facts.26 But in Feist, the “industrious collection” of facts was found to be
insufficient for copyright and full-blown copying of public domain content was permitted
even if that took place through a new copyrighted work.27 It seems clear as a matter of
copyright proper that the public domain original can be accessed through a scan without
running afoul of copyright even if we were to assign a copyright to the scan itself.28
C. Appropriability Incentives and the Public Domain
We know that spillovers—positive externalities—are an important feature of intellectual
property works. The fact that use of the works is nonrivalrous means that from the
perspective of creators, without more, they will only capture a fraction of the value that

26 See, e.g., Rockford Maps Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colorado, Inc., 768 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985)

(“The second compiler must assemble the material as if there had never been a first compilation; only then may the
second compiler use the first as a check on error.”).
27 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 (“Thus, if the compilation author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she

may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression. Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication,
but not the precise words used to present them.”).
28 This idea works most naturally when we are talking about accessing text through a scan. Matters become more

interesting if we switch from text to images, but sorting through that isn’t really the point of this paper. I talk about
some of these issues in a blog post, Fairey v. Associated Press: Yes He Can, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2009), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/fairey-v-associated-pressyes-he-can.html.
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they create and much of the value will spill over to third parties. To just be slightly more
concrete about that in the context here, in a nonfiction text work, the author controls only
her expression of the underlying facts and ideas but those facts and ideas themselves
enter the public domain and thereby spill over. The spillover point, of course, means that
there may be insufficient private incentives to create socially-valuable works. But the
spillover point is general. Here I want to consider the extent to which a creator might be
willing to destroy social value to boost appropriability. The point isn’t to destroy value,
of course, but more that given incomplete appropriability, the creator won’t take into
account destroyed social value in her efforts to grab a larger slice of the pie.
Take a simple situation to see these issues. A creator can take a step to create a work.
Doing so, absent more, will result in value of 6 to the creator and an additional value of
10 to the rest of society. The 10 represents external benefits from the creation of the
work. There is an additional tool available to the creator—in the section below I will
discuss technical protection measures, contractual provisions and other means—that
would that would boost her take from 6 to 7 but at the cost of reducing the external
benefits to 5. How should we assess this additional restriction?
We can’t say. If we knew that the creator would create the work even without the
provision—receiving 6 was enough of a motivation—then we would do better to have a
pie of 16 created, assuming we are neutral about how benefits are distributed. The creator
would have a private incentive to adopt the restriction, but that would be a bad outcome
because she would be destroying 4 units of value just to get 1 more. But if 6 is an
insufficient motivation to get the work created and 7 will do the trick, then we are clearly
better off to have the restriction imposed.
We can see the problem for law. On the one hand, when appropriability is incomplete
or imperfect, creators will be willing to destroy social value sometimes at a high cost in
an effort to boost appropriability. Creators may be willing to inflict high social losses
even for modest gains to themselves. But, to go to the other hand, barring these
restrictions will shrink overall welfare if the incremental appropriability is actually
marginal for the creation of the work in the first place. The question is how to
operationalize these notions. I will try to do more of that below as I talk through
particular examples.
III. The Tools of Controlling Access to the Public Domain
Assembling libraries of public domain materials involves substantial amounts of time and
effort. Given that, we can hardly be surprised when digitizers look for tools to protect
their investments. I will consider four plausible tools available to digitizers: copyright;
contracts and terms of use; the DMCA; and the CFAA.
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A. Copyright
The average digital scan is in some basic sense a photograph of a piece of paper, so we
should review quickly the basics of copyright in photographs. We start, of course, with
the Supreme Court’s 1884 decision in Burrow-Giles and Sarony’s photograph of Oscar
Wilde.29 Burrow-Giles helped itself to that photograph and then defended its use on the
ground that the photograph was a “mere mechanical reproduction” and hence
insufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection. The Court acknowledged that
that might be the case for the “ordinary production of a photograph” though it declined to
conclude that no copyright would attach even then. But Sarony had done much more in
creating the photograph of Wilde: Sarony had composed the picture, arranged Wilde’s
pose and the setting for it, adjusted the lighting and shading, and all of that together
represented an original creation by Sarony.
But the line that Burrow-Giles seemed to suggest—we should look for originality in
the creation of the subject of the photograph—went by the by as courts embraced
copyright in uncreated subjects (such as outdoor settings like the New York Public
Library).30 As soon as we took that path, we were going to have huge numbers of original
photographs. Go to a party, take a bunch of pictures, create original copyrighted works.
Indeed, the more interesting question quickly becomes: what does an unoriginal
photograph look like? Burrow-Giles could of course have copied the Sarony photograph
of Wilde by getting Wilde to repose and by making sure that every aspect of the new
photograph matched the old one. That would be as much a copy of the Sarony
photograph—and therefore unoriginal—as what Burrow-Giles did in the actual case.
Next, have Burrow-Giles take a photograph of Sarony’s photograph of Wilde. That is
just as much a copy of the original photograph as when Burrow-Giles recreated the
picture per my hypo. That photograph of the photograph should be treated as a copy of
the original photograph and unoriginal. You could, of course, make an original
photograph that incorporated the Sarony photograph—perhaps with the photograph
surrounded by other objects—but a pure photo of the photo should be treated as a copy.
When you take such a photo of a copyrighted photo, you infringe. When the original
photo is no longer copyrighted because it has entered the public domain, your photo
doesn’t infringe but it doesn’t cease to be a copy and it still lacks originality.
Where does that put digital scans of public domain texts? We are starting to see
skirmishes over photographs and scans of public domain works. The British National
Portrait Gallery got into a spat with Wikipedia when Derrick Coetzee, a Wikipedia
participant, uploaded into Wikipedia digital images created by the NPG of public domain

29 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
30 Pagano v. Chas. Beseler Co., 234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). Justin Hughes regards this expansive approach to the

copyrightablity of photographs as a mistake. See Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—photograph as art,
photograph as database (fortmcoming HARV. J. L. TECH.)
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works in its collection.31 Actual case law is scarce, with Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel
Corp., a 1999 federal district court decision, as a leading case.32 The court characterized
the dispute as one over “‘slavish copies’ of public domain works of art” and concluded
that such copies lacked the spark of originality and therefore could not be copyrighted.33
As a freestanding proposition, it is hard to see how we could think of a digital scan as
having sufficient originality to enjoy copyright protection. The essence of a high-quality
digital scan of a text is perfect fidelity to the underlying physical page. A bad scan
introduces imperfections and systematic deviations from the original physical page might
be original, but those aren’t the scans that we hope our digital curators are making.
But retrace our steps as to copyrights in photographs to see how we have done and
focus not on the single digital scan but instead consider a continuum of original
photographs. Put the fully-posed and staged Sarony photograph of Wilde perhaps at one
of the continuum. Move to photographs of objects such as the Grand Canyon or the
White House. Consider a rose in your back yard. At least as conventionally understood,
copyright will subsist in each of those photographs. You might think of a photograph of a
rose in your backyard as probably nothing more than a slavish copy of the rose and yet it
is hard to imagine that a court would find insufficient originality in the photo. Yet a photo
of a photo will probably be found to be nothing more than a copy of the original work,
infringing or not depending on whether the work has entered the public domain, but
almost certainly lacking sufficient originality for the second photo or scan to be
independently copyrightable.
B. Terms of Use and Contract
As noted above, we should expect those digitizing public domain content to use contract
to limit how the resulting scans are used. That is exactly what we see in practice. We
need to map out the TOS-and-contract space a little before examining it in detail. Some
OPDRs are privately-held and operate for profit but are generally available to the public
(Google Book Search). That access may be conditional in that a TOS or contract may
apply at various points of use. Other OPDRs are operated by non-profits—JSTOR,
HathiTrust and the Internet Archive—but may offer different levels of access to members
and non-members (HathiTrust and JSTOR prior to its recent unbundling of its public
domain works) or may offer equal access to the public (the Internet Archive) again
subject to possible TOS or contract limits at the point of actual use.
As all of that suggests, the breadth of access to the public is a complex pattern.
Because Google uses a two-sided financing model—advertisers pay to reach

31 Rory Cellan-Jones, Wikipedia Painting Row Escalates, BBC NEWS (July 17, 2009)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8156268.stm. Some of the correspondence in the case can be found online at
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Dcoetzee/NPG_legal_threat.
32 36 F.Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
33 Id. at 197.
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consumers—public access is full though it comes with standard Google issues regarding
privacy and tracking, but, to be clear, you can use Google Book Search anonymously.
ProQuest, our other private firm, charges users directly and that means much more
limited access to the public. HathiTrust’s limits on the public domain to non-members
appear to be at least partially derived from the fact that many of their public domain scans
are traceable to underlying contracts with Google and, as detailed below, those contracts
imposed restrictions on Google’s library partners. For most of its life, JSTOR had
operated with a bundled access model: access to in-copyright works was bundled with
access to public domain works. Even though JSTOR is a nonprofit, it needs to finance its
operations and thus charges members fees for access to its databases. JSTOR has a rich
approach to licensing—you can mix and match across multiple collections—but it had
not separately unbundled a public domain collection and made that available to the public
until 2011. All of that describes the general structure of access to the OPDRs. Actual use
is subject to more detailed restrictions.
1. JSTOR
Consider that favorite of the academic researcher, www.jstor.org. 34 JSTOR provides
scans of academic works in many fields. Of course, much of that work is in copyright,
but the pre-1923 U.S. work is in the public domain.35 And JSTOR makes some of that
work available for free to the public. But when you try to download a public domain
work, you are presented with terms. You are told that “Your use of the JSTOR archive
indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions,” with a link to those terms.
If you don’t click in acceptance, you can’t download the public domain work. And if you
want to read the terms, get a cup of coffee first: it runs 7,524 words.
Consider just the special codicil for what JSTOR terms “Early Journal Content.” This
is content published in journals prior to 1923 in the U.S. or prior to 1870 if initially
published internationally.36 JSTOR “encourages broad use” of this content, but while
users are “free to copy, use, and redistribute” this content that use is limited to noncommercial purposes, and JSTOR asks that you attribute the content to JSTOR.37 JSTOR
also addresses bulk downloads: “Please be considerate of other users and do not use
robots or other devices to systematically download these works as this may be disruptive
to our systems.”38

34 For background on JSTOR, see Roger C. Schonfeld, JSTOR: A History (Princeton Univ. Press 2003).
35 Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in World, JSTOR (Sept. 6, 2011),

http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.
36 Terms and Conditions of Use, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp (last visited July 3,

2012).
37 Id.
38 Id.
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2. GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH
Public domain downloads from the Google Book Search project come with similar
limitations set forth in the first page of the file. Google offers something of a paean to the
public domain. The public domain book that you have downloaded, you are told “is a
digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was
carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world’s books discoverable
online.”39 Google goes on to explain that “… a public domain book is one that was never
subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. … Public domain books
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge
that’s often difficult to discover.” And “[p]ublic domain books belong to the public and
we are merely their custodians.”
And, with one word, the tone and content shift: “Nevertheless.” Nevertheless
meaning that the scanning of the public domain is something like a quarter of a billiondollar undertaking and Google has an investment to protect. “Nevertheless, this work is
expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent
abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated
querying.” You are requested to use the files for only “personal, non-commercial
purposes.” You are told to “refrain from automated querying” and to maintain the Google
watermark embedded in each file. The watermark “is essential for informing people
about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book
Search.”
3. INTERNET ARCHIVE
The Archive is an important, free-standing nonprofit effort to create a digital repository
for the artifacts of the Internet Age. The Archive offers a number of key tools. Want to
see how the Google homepage has evolved over time? Go visit IA’s Wayback Machine.
But, as noted above, the Archive also has an extensive collection of public domain works,
and all of that comes with a terms of use.40 You are to use the archive for “scholarship
and research purposes only.”41 Presumably, commercial use is forbidden. The TOU
doesn’t seem to address automated querying or bulk downloading directly but it does bar
you from doing anything “to interfere with the work of other users or Archive personnel,
servers, or resources.”42 And the Archive wants attribution for its contribution to your
research.43
39 These quotes are taken from the front page that Google attached to LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN

WONDERLAND 1 (The MacMillan Co. eds.,1898) available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=CLoNAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
40 Internet Archive’s Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, and Copyright Policy, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Mar. 10, 2001),

http://archive.org/about/terms.php.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 “In addition, we request that, according to standard academic practice, if you use the Archive's Collections for any
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4. HATHITRUST
The HathiTrust imposes a number of key limits on the public domain works that it hosts.
These limits reflect the origins of many of the works which arose through the deals cut by
Google with its academic library partners. Under those deals, libraries would be entitled
under some circumstances to receive back their own digital copies but often subject to
substantial contractual restrictions. Hathi has emerged as a key way for those libraries to
navigate their obligations to Google. In addition to that, Hathi has its own cost model and
imposes restrictions on use to support that model.44 For the public domain works, this
means that these “volumes are freely accessible to the public and can be downloaded in
their entirety with authentication by persons affiliated with partner institutions.”45
***
We see a number of limits that run across these situations. One bars copying at scale: you
aren’t allowed to simply copy all of the public domain documents and replicate the
original service. From one perspective, you might think that these services would
welcome wholesale copying. Some of the downloads would be diverted to other sites and
the original sites would save some of the download and hosting costs. Yet our OPDRs
routinely bar bulk downloading.
It seems clear that the OPDRs value control over the public domain works they have
amassed. Some of this goes to the revenue opportunities associated with these works.
Google could serve ads and collect information through the hosting of works. That seems
less true of the Internet Archive, but the Archive seems to value attribution and may
believe that that interest is more likely to be vindicated if users have to come to the
Archive to see works. Hathi’s limits may be derivative of the original relationship with of
Hathi’s members with Google. And JSTOR’s approach on this has evolved from the
original bundled model—the public domain works bundled with in-copyright works—to
now allowing broad access to its public domain materials.
We see a second limit frequently as well: a restriction to noncommercial use of the
materials or research use. We should think of this as an option on commercial use of the
materials. By that I mean that a person desiring to make commercial use of the materials
would be required to negotiate for rights to use the works in a commercial fashion. The
repository would hold an option on those commercial uses in that it could negotiate for a
chunk of the upside of the new project in exchange for its consent to allow use of its
public domain materials. This really does take us back to a version of the independent
sourcing notion discussed above in Section II.B. We are talking here of commercial use
of public domain materials. If you have independent access to these materials, you need
research that results in an article, a book, or other publication, you list the Archive as a resource in your bibliography.”
Id.
44 See Cost, HATHITRUST DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://www.hathitrust.org/cost (last visited July 3, 2012).
45 See Features and Benefits, HATHITRUST DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://www.hathitrust.org/features_benefits (last visited

July 3, 2012).
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not pay a fee to use them, but absent that access, a new commercial user might be stuck
paying the repository for access to the public domain.
C. DMCA
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is often referred to as a paracopyright statute in
that its approach to protecting copyrighted work differs substantially from more
traditional approaches to copyright. The DMCA implements a lock-and-key system for
copyrighted works. To simplify considerably, individuals are barred from trying to
unlock locked works and, to step a level up, the statute also limits trafficking in tools that
facilitate unlocking locked works.
Digital rights management (DRM) of the sort protected by the DMCA is
controversial. DRM is extensively used by Amazon as part of its Kindle platform, by
Apple in running iTunes through its FairPlay software, and was baked into the DVD
platform in the form of the Content Scramble System (CSS).46 DRM defenders focus on,
among other things, the way in which lock-and-key systems can support useful crossproduct subsidies between hardware and content, while DRM detractors focus on the use
limits that arise and the way in which DRM can limit after-the-fact competition, both
limits that they regard as objectionable given what they see as the ease by which DRM
schemes can be evaded by the hardcore.
What role should a digital lock-and-key system play for digital scans of public
domain works? We face our usual analysis. For-profit scanners will want to control the
works and, as noted above, may be willing to sacrifice overall social value to boost
appropriability. At the same time, absent a digital lock, for-profit scanners may be
unwilling to see their scans distributed in the clear. Doing so will may make it easier for
competitors to scoop up those scans without having to incur the original costs of
scanning. Many users might not find digital locks problematic and would prefer to have a
downloaded copy rather than one permanently tied to an online digital repository. That
can be about convenience—no need to have Internet access—but also about privacy or
perceived privacy. And a downloaded copy might be more stable than a copy served
through the OPDR.
Lest all of this be thought a bit hypothetical, consider how Google has approached the
scans in Google Book Search and how its competitors would like access to those scans.
The DMCA comes with many limits, including that the statute calls for a rule-making
every three years undertaken by the Librarian of Congress and the Register of

46 For info on these, see Jeremy Greenfield, Bookseller Backed by Big Publishers Advocates Abandoning Digital

Rights Management, DIGITAL BOOK WORLD (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2012/booksellerbacked-by-big-publishers-advocates-abandoning-digital-rights-management/; Bryan Bishop, Apple’s FairPlay DRM
for iBooks Cracked by Requiem App, THE VERGE (Feb. 25, 2012),
http://www.theverge.com/2012/2/25/2823218/apples-fairplay-drm-ibooks-cracked-requiem-app; Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Copyrights.47 The target of the rulemaking is “any class of copyrighted works” such that
the digital locks validated by the DMCA are, or are likely, to adversely affect
noninfringing uses of those classes of work.48 Note that the rulemaking powers call off
unlocking liability but not liability for making or trafficking in tools of unlocking.
On December 1, 2011, in the current rulemaking proceeding being conducted by the
U.S. Copyright Office, the Open Book Alliance has asked the Copyright Office to
address digital scans of public domain works. The Open Book Alliance’s mission is, in its
words, “to assert that any mass book digitization and publishing effort be open and
competitive.”49 The OBA is a comprised of a mix of tech firms such as Amazon,
Microsoft and Yahoo!; author groups, such as the American Society of Journalists and
Authors and National Writers Union; and reader facing organizations such as the Internet
Archive and the New York Library Association.
To be faithful to its statutory mandate, the Copyright Office classifies the requests it
receives and it characterizes the OBA request as involving “literary works in the public
domain that are made available in digital copies.”50 The OBA in turn sees its request as
directed at “prying open Google’s closed books.51 As detailed in its December 1, 2011
filing with the Copyright Office, the OBA describes the measures that Google has
undertaken to lock up the scanned books.52
The OBA focuses on the contracts that Google signed with libraries to set up the rules
of the game for digitizing the books held by the libraries. Those contracts are quite useful
because they give a good sense of the institutional undertaking involved in making the
public domain available. Of course, there is a way in which much of the public domain is
just sitting there somewhere. These are the physical copies of the works that have entered
the public domain. But there is a long, long road from sitting somewhere to being
meaningfully available to all and Google’s contracts with the libraries make that crystal
clear. That is especially true given that Google and the libraries have been creating
contracts amidst substantial uncertainty over the copyright foundations of the GBS
project.
Our focus here is on the DMCA and the technical locks contemplated in the
agreements with the libraries. Google announced its partnership with key libraries in mid-

47 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
48 Id.
49 Mission, OPEN BOOK ALLIANCE, http://www.openbookalliance.org/mission/ (last visited July 3, 2012).
50 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, U.S.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2011/initial/ (last visited July 3, 2012).
51 Prying Open Google’s Closed Books, OPEN BOOK ALLIANCE (Dec. 2, 2011),

http://www.openbookalliance.org/2011/12/prying-open-google%E2%80%99s-closed-books/.
52 Open Book Alliance, Comments of the Open Book Alliance (OBA); Docket No. RM 2011-7 (Dec. 01, 2011),

http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2011/initial/open_book_alliance.pdf [Open Book Alliance Comment].
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December 2004.53 To take just one example, Google and the University of Michigan
signed their original agreement on June 15, 200554 and that was subsequently amended
on May 20, 2009 to adjust the agreement after the (attempted) settlement of the Google
Book Search litigation.55
As Google scans, Google and Michigan each get a copy. 56 The contract envisions that
Michigan’s copy will be made available through Michigan’s website and will also be
available through cooperative arrangements with partner research libraries. In doing that,
Michigan is required to “implement technological measures (e.g., through the use of the
robots.txt protocol) to restrict automated access” to Michigan’s copies of the scans. 57 And
Google and Michigan together are to cooperate to develop methods to ensure that there
are no bulk downloads of the digital copies at Michigan. Under the original contract, the
restrictions on the use of Michigan’s copy of the scans are independent of the copyright
status of the books, and works in the public domain faced exactly the same limits as
works in copyright. The 2009 amendment adjusted this somewhat given the proposed
class-action settlement, though that settlement seems dead for now.
At GBS, public domain books are usually available for download as a pdf or in the
epub format. It isn’t clear to me whether those books, once downloaded, come subject to
some sort of technological protection measure. But it is also clear that independent of
that, what really troubles the OBA is technical protection measures that prevent largescale downloads of the scans of public domain works. As the OBA puts it in its filing:
While Google at the moment allows users to manually download
individual PDFs of public domain works at the Google Books site, the
stringent TPMs it imposes with respect to automated access prevent
broader use of these files by competing search engines, digital libraries,
and other online providers. It simply would not be feasible for an
organization to make manual downloads of over three million books.58
To assess this, we should start with law and then turn to policy. We need to start with
Section 1201 on circumvention of copyright protection systems. When you read Sec.
1201(a)(1) it is hard to avoid one conclusion: it simply doesn’t apply to public domain
works. Subparagraph (A) of that section bars any person from circumventing a

53 See Press Release, Google Checks Out Library Books, GOOGLE INC. (Dec. 14, 2004),

http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html.
54 Cooperative Agreement, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, http://www.lib.umich.edu/files/services/mdp/um-google-

cooperative-agreement.pdf (last visited July 3, 2012).
55 See the timeline set out at Michigan Digitization Project, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,

http://www.lib.umich.edu/michigan-digitization-project (last visited July 3, 2012). The settlement of the class action
brought by the Authors Guild against Google was rejected and that litigation is still pending. See The Authors Guild v.
Google Inc., 770 F.Supp 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
56 See Cooperative Agreement Sec. 2.5
57 Id. at Sec. 4.4.1
58 See Open Book Alliance Comment, supra note 52, at 24.
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technological measure that “effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title.” That of course is a reference to the copyright title and, presumably, to a
copyrighted work. The next subparagraph confirms that certain classes of copyrighted
works are exempt from the prior limits if the Librarian of Congress chooses to exempt
them pursuant to the terms of subparagraph (C). That exemption is implemented by
having the Librarian publish “any class of copyrighted works” that are to receive the
benefit of the exemption scheme for a three-year window. None of the text applies
naturally to works in the public domain and Section 1201(a)(1) is best read not to apply
to public domain works.
Step back and assess what all of that means. Suppose that I download a public domain
scan to my computer and I discover that it comes subject to DRM protection. Assuming
that the scan itself is not a new copyrighted work—see Section III.A above—I don’t
violate Section 1201(a)(1)(A) if I circumvent that measure, as that section only applies to
measures that protect works protected under title 17, meaning works in copyright. At the
same time, the anticircumvention rulemaking process conducted by the Librarian of
Congress only addresses copyrighted works, so nothing there seems to empower the
Librarian to somehow exempt efforts to crack public domain scans.
All of that means that the DMCA is not likely to be the source of either protection for
scans or for exemptions for people seeking to circumvent whatever DRM is embedded in
the scans though the DMCA does limit the overall development of decryption tools and
that may offer some protection even for public domain scans. Whether that is good or bad
policy is a question that I am skeptical that we are well-situated to answer. This takes us
back to the appropriability discussion in Section II.C. There are substantial costs to scan
books. I am not sure what the right number is, but I have seen figures as high as $100 per
book.59 The OBA suggests that Google has scanned 3 million public domain books and
that would get us quickly to $300 million dollars or exactly the estimated budget of
Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End.60 Real money to be sure, but the sort of money
that big firms spend with frequency.
The OBA filing argues that “[i]t simply would not be feasible for an organization to
make manual downloads of over three million books.” That is an interesting claim.
Apparently, it was feasible for an organization to digitize 3 million public domain
books—that would be Google of course—but downloading those copies one-by-one is
the real stumper. This seems difficult to understand. I assume that the most expensive
undertaking is organizing and scanning the public domain, the least expensive a bulk
download of someone else’s scans. One-by-one downloads sits in the middle. Doable, but
not as cheap as bulk downloading.
59 The Authors Guild mentions this figure in a filing in its lawsuit against the HathiTrust. See The Authors Guild, Inc.

v. HathiTrust, No. 11 Civ. 6351 (HB), Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings, Feb. 28, 2012, p5.
60 See BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=piratesofthecaribbean3.htm (last visited July 3, 2012).
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Of course, Google doesn’t want to face a first-mover disadvantage where it bears the
cost of scanning and then second-movers free ride on those scans. We might welcome
competition in the scans given the complaints about the quality of the scans, but if the
scans were perfect, we shouldn’t want a second set of scans to be made. Of course in that
circumstance, we might imagine that Google might license the scans to potential entrants
where Google and the entrant would split the cost of doing the second set of scans. The
cost of duplicating those scans would define the size of the pie available to be split in a
licensing deal.
Of course, without legal protection for the locks, we can envision a number of
unattractive outcomes. One is a standard cat-and-mouse arms race, where Google invests
in locking the scans and the attackers seek to unlock them. Although we can learn things
of interest during these kinds of wars, we should think that most of the resources in these
tech wars are wasted. If we validate the locks—as the DMCA does for copyrighted works
but not seemingly for public domain works—we cut off the unlocking tech war. If we
don’t validate the locks, then scanners will take other steps that we may not like. That
may mean that they won’t allow downloading generally and instead operate the access to
the scans as a service. That possibility would mean that we would not only have DMCA
issues but probably issues under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as well.
D. CFAA
As passed, the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984
put in place a targeted regime to protect against unauthorized access to computers. That
statute was quite detailed but it picked up certain information relating to national defense
and foreign relations; certain financial records; and other information on computers
operated by the government. That is actually pretty sizable, but amendments to the statute
greatly expanded its reach and that is our interest here. The current version of the statute
is complicated but to take it in its broadest formulation it treats as a criminal “[w]hoever
… intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains … information from any protected computer.”61 “Protected
computer” is a defined term as is “computer” but, to simplify, that now picks up any
computer used in interstate commerce.62 Meaning any computer on the Internet. The
targeted regime of the 1984 act has become quite broad and the breadth of that is now
being sorted out in the courts.
On July 14, 2011, the federal government issued a four-count indictment against
Aaron Swartz alleging wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information
from a protected computer and recklessly damaging a protected computer. Swartz was

61 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
62 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(e)(1)-(e)(2).
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then a twenty-four year old Harvard researcher with a strong record of digital activism.63
Swartz had authored the Guerilla Open Access Manifesto in which he set forth a call to
liberate the world’s knowledge from restrictions.64
Swartz argued that those with access to materials had a moral obligation to share
those materials with others by trading passwords and by downloading files for friends.
But Swartz envisioned a more systematic response to what he termed the “private theft of
public culture:”
We need to take information, wherever it is stored, make our copies and
share them with the world. We need to take stuff that’s out of copyright
and add it to the archive. We need to buy secret databases and put them on
the Web. We need to download scientific journals and upload them to file
sharing networks. We need to fight for Guerilla Open Access.
According to the indictment, over a four-month period in 2010 and early 2011, Swartz set
out to do exactly that by downloading millions of scholarly works from JSTOR.
Swartz had the ability to access JSTOR legitimately through his Harvard position,
but, as detailed above, that access came with many restrictions. Swartz sidestepped those
by going to MIT and accessing their network through a guest network access set up.
Somewhat surprisingly, the guest access rules at MIT seemed to allow access to JSTOR
and use that access he did to “download an extraordinary volume of articles from
JSTOR.”65
Both JSTOR and MIT responded to this, and this set the usual pattern of
response/counter-response that we see in these situations. As Swartz was temporarily
denied access to JSTOR and MIT resources, Swartz pursued other paths. He spoofed the
MAC address on his laptop—used to provide a unique identifier for someone accessing a
network—switched laptops and eventually hard-wired a link into the network in an MIT
communications closet. Given the volume of downloads, it was hard for Swartz’s
activities to go on undetected: In two months, Swartz used one laptop to make two
million downloads at MIT, a volume that was more than one hundred times as great as all
of the legitimate downloads at MIT combined.66
We can now return to our public domain scans. It is clear that the CFAA applies to a
much broader set of information than the DMCA. The core concern of the CFAA is the
invasion of a computer by an outsider to get at information. Very little of that information
may be in copyright, as it may consist of raw facts and, under Feist, copyright doesn’t
attach to facts. A number of CFAA cases have concerned scraping of content from public
63 John Schwartz, Open-Access Advocate is Arrested for Huge Download, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 19, 2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/20compute.html.
64 Aaron Swartz, The Guerilla Open Access Manifesto, P2P FOUNDATION BLOG (Aug. 7, 2011),
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65 Swartz Indictment ¶ 16.
66 Id. ¶25.
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websites allegedly in violation of the terms of service of those websites. Exactly how the
authorization provisions of the CFAA work is a matter of controversy and the Ninth
Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Nosal created a conflict in concluding that the CFAA
did not apply to violations of terms of use.67
***
Taken together, we can see the issues posed by these tools. As described in Section II.C,
amassers of the public domain will have strong incentives to restrict use to prevent
competition. And beyond direct competition, they will seek to restrict use to preserve an
option on future noncompeting uses. That option represents a tax on future innovative
activities, though one cabined to some extent by the possibility of tracking down an
original artifact containing the public domain work. Of course, that self-help limit works
best when we are talking about a single work, especially if the work isn’t embodied in a
unique physical artifact. The rarer the artifact or the more artifacts that must be accessed,
the harder it will be to duplicate.
At the same time, it is very hard for us to assess how much propertization is necessary
to ensure that our OPDRs have successful financing models. The common restriction on
bulk downloading directly bars the emergence of easy competition at the same scale but
also is fully understandable as a way of supporting the financing model of amassing the
public domain. Absent that, we would have a classic second-mover advantage collective
action problem—“no you scan, no, no why don’t you go first”—and we can’t all be free
riders.
The underlying contract regime then ties into the technical protection regimes of the
DMCA and the CFAA. As written, the DMCA seems to offer little direct protection for
public domain works subject to DRM-type schemes, though the way in which the DMCA
limits overall development of decryption tools may provide some indirect protection for
DRM-wrapped public domain works. With the Nosal decision, the CFAA seems to be in
a state of uncertainty. The CFAA seems to entwine together technical protections and
authorization and that takes us exactly to the boundary where our OPDRs will operate.
IV. A Public Public Domain
In the U.S., we are seeing the emergence of a meaningful private public domain through
the efforts of Google, JSTOR, ProQuest, the Internet Archive, the HathiTrust and others.
This is an interesting and nice mix of for-profit and non-profit organizations. And if we
focus on the scope of actual access by the public to the public domain, a great deal has
been accomplished. Google has made nearly 3 million volumes available to all for free,
subject, to be sure, to advertising and privacy concerns, though, again, GBS can be used
fully anonymously. Google could close GBS tomorrow and it is reported that its scanning
efforts have slowed down, though that would be expected at some point in the project and
67 United States v. Nosal 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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the slowdown doesn’t necessarily reflect the overhang of the ongoing litigation over
GBS.
JSTOR has made its slice of the public domain available to the public, though again
nothing would prevent JSTOR from taking back and limiting access to the public domain.
The ProQuest treasure trove—and I have mentioned only the historical newspapers but
ProQuest has much more, including a historical database of company annual reports—is
a big piece of the public domain not available to the public generally, though ProQuest is
eager to license its databases to public libraries. Of course, libraries make acquisition
trade-offs all of the time and a library not licensing ProQuest’s public domain materials is
making exactly that sort of choice.
But none of these are true public organizations like the great public libraries and each
runs an access model that reflects the need to pay the bills. The natural alternative is a
government-funded public library, the digital equivalent of the public libraries in
communities across the country. In the United States, this might be housed at the Library
of Congress—go to www.digitalpreservation.gov to see their efforts—or might be the
nascent Digital Public Library of America. And we are likely to see efforts across the
globe, such as europeana.eu.
We should step back briefly to consider the broader idea of public property and then
situate the public domain in that notion. There is a long-standing idea that certain
property is held in a public trust by the government. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted
recently: “The public trust doctrine is of ancient origin. Its roots trace to Roman civil law
and its principles can be found in the English common law on public navigation and
fishing rights over tidal lands and in the state laws of this country.”68 The public trust
doctrine operates today to police the boundary between private property and the rights of
the public most frequently on waterways and beaches.69 At its core, this is the idea of a
public commons open to all.
We speak about copyright’s public domain in exactly those terms but that is a
shorthand and one that ignores both the private origins of the public domain and the
differences that arise between intellectual property and physical property given the
nonrivalnous of the former and the limited nature of the latter. As the public trust fights
over beaches demonstrate, beach space is scarce and if a private party is able to fence off
part of the beach, the balance of the public loses real access to the beach.
Copyright’s public domain doesn’t operate that way. First, the content that enters the
public domain started its life as private content. The underlying objects in which the work
was embodied—paper for years but other media today—were typically privately owned.
The public had no right to the blank paper and our hypothetical author’s ownership of the
paper no more removed it from the public than occurs with any other private property.
68 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, xxx U.S. xxx, xxx (2012).
69 See, e.g., Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
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The public’s right to that paper didn’t change when words were first put on paper. Under
U.S. copyright law before 1976, an author could create a work and never publish it and
thereby retain a perpetual common-law copyright under state law.70 These private works
would never enter the public domain. So unlike the waterways that make up the core of
the public trust doctrine, the works that make it into copyright’s public domain first
started in private hands and were in no sense somehow removed from public hands.71
We then turn to the nonrivalnous of intellectual property. As noted before, moving
beach-front property out of public hands reduces the public’s ability to access that land.
In contrast, allowing digitizers to enforce the restrictions that emerge from the tools
described in Section xxx above does not remove access to the public domain from the
public. The key word there is “remove” as the restrictions clearly limit access relative to
the full, unfettered access that would occur from a truly public public domain. After
digitization, the public’s access to the public domain is almost always expanded: the
public continues to have whatever prior access it had to the physical objects in which the
public domain is embedded plus the public picks up the access created by the digitizer.
There are, to be sure, wrinkles here. We do need to attend to the extent to which holders
of public domain objects exit from those objects given the digitization. It is expensive for
libraries to manage these physical objects and they may deaccess them—that is
libraryspeak for tossing them—given the existence of digital alternatives.
All of that suggest why there is some push for a true public public domain in the form
of a national—international?—digital public library. Private digitization will come with
restrictions and it isn’t clear that anyone is doing a good job of internalizing the issue of
how broad access to the public domain should be achieved. Individual libraries
destroying old newspapers won’t take into account the way in which that action deprives
the public of public domain access. There is no obvious steward for the public domain.
A public digital library could take many forms. A full-blown undertaking would
mean that the library would create its own search engine for content and would undertake
all of the work required to stock the library with digital content. That would mean
contracts with current, active copyright holders, some approach to orphan works and
scanning of the public domain. The government would also have to build search
technology or contract for it. A much more modest effort would be a scanned corpus
created by the government and made available to all users. The government could host
those works but could also allow private parties to incorporate those scans into their own
offerings.

70 For discussion, see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908).
71 Given that, as might be expected, the effort to extend the public trust doctrine to copyright’s public domain has so

far been unsuccessful. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
aff'd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For additional discussion, see Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as
Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 Or. L. Rev. 647 (2000).
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Describing a public digital library is obviously a large topic and I want to avoid it
here, save for one point, namely the relationship between access to the public domain and
copyright’s deposit requirement. Our first federal copyright statue, the 1790 Copyright
Act, brought with it a dual deposit requirement. Authors were required to deposit a copy
of the work prior to publication with their local district court and within six months after
publication with the Secretary of State.72 Section 407 sets out the current version of the
deposit requirement. Copyright owners are required to deposit with the Copyright Office
two copies of the work within three months of publication, unless the Register of
Copyrights has exempted the work from the deposit requirement.73
The critical question is whether we should think that the deposit requirement is by
design or effect the way in which we stock our digital public library. We could imagine
this as central quid pro quo for copyright protection: authors would receive copyright
protection but do so subject to the requirement that they turn over multiple copies of their
work to the government. You can easily imagine how we might adjust this right. At one
extreme, the deposit copies would go instantly into our digital public library and would
be available for check out. If we treated these as we would physical books, the digital
book could only be accessed once it was returned by the prior user. Of course, the
transaction costs of check out and return would be much lower; not quite a friction free
environment but close.
An alternative approach would be to treat the deposit copies as just stocking the
public domain in advance. Think of the deposit copies as a type of public domain escrow.
In-copyright works in the escrow wouldn’t be available for use by the public until they
entered the public domain. At that point, the access problem would be solved and we
would, presumably, allow downloading and use of these public domain works without
restriction.
The library idea and the public domain escrow notion are obviously quite different.
The library could operate as a powerful tax on copyrighted works and a tax borne
exclusively by authors. The books in the digital library would substitute for books that
would otherwise be purchased by libraries and might substitute for private purchases as
well. We don’t typically have special in-kind taxes. Law professors need not go teach
free law classes as a condition for having full rights to the revenues generated by their
regular teaching of classes. The deposit requirement as in-kind tax is a vision of
copyright as a special kind of government protection—privilege and not right—and given
that status as a privilege one that the government is entitled to attach conditions to. The
public domain escrow notion recognizes that assembling the public domain is real work
with substantial public benefits.

72 Secs. 3 and 4 of the 1790 Act.
73 See Mandatory Deposit, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/mandatory_deposit.html (last

updated Jan. 24, 2011).
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Conclusion
Like the future, as the saying goes, the public domain is already here, it is just unevenly
distributed. The public domain is bound to physical artifacts and even though the public
domain is free to use to all, its physical instantiation is tied to particular locations. In
some cases, for especially rare works, access may be particularly limited.
But with the rise of mass digitization, actual access to the public domain is growing
dramatically. But amassing, digitizing and hosting the public domain takes real resources
and it is hardly surprising that the entities doing this work simultaneously impose
restrictions on the use of the public domain. In turn, how law responds to those
restrictions will determine the structure of competition over the use and delivery of the
public domain.
In structuring that competition, we are likely to encounter a wide range of legal tools
that implicate that competition. These include the laws of contract, copyright, the DMCA
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Freestanding decisions will be made in each of
these areas, often without careful consideration of the consequences for the potential
public domain competition that animates this paper.
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